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Last spring the Supreme Court of Canada released judgments in a 
pair of cases involving the use of drug-sniffing dogs by police: R. v. 
Kang-Brown
1
 and R. v. M. (A.).
2
 These decisions received considerable 
media attention, mostly for what they had to say about the constitutionality 
of the police employing drug-sniffing dogs.
3
 Lost in the media coverage, 
which was confused by the sheer length of the Court‟s opinions and the 
fact that the justices issued four separate sets of reasons in each case, was 
a larger controversy regarding the Court‟s continued use of the “ancillary 
powers doctrine” as a means of creating new common law police powers. 
The ancillary powers doctrine allows for the recognition of police 
powers by deploying what is essentially a cost-benefit analysis. This law-
making device has two parts. First, it begins with a query as to whether 
the impugned actions of a police officer fall within the scope of his or her 
broad duties.
4
 Assuming the answer is “yes”,
5
 the second step involves a 
weighing of the apparent benefits, usually for law enforcement and 
public safety, as against any resulting interference with individual liberty 
                                                                                                             
‡  A much earlier version of this case comment was originally published on Osgoode Hall 
Law School‟s Blog, online at: <http://www.TheCourt.ca>, and then reproduced with permission in 
(2009) 30(2) For the Defence, Criminal Lawyers’ Association Newsletter 26. The research assistance 
of Yulia Pesin (Osgoode, LL.B. 2011) is gratefully acknowledged. 
*  Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School at York University. 
1  [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kang-Brown”]. 
2  [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M. (A.)”]. 
3  See, e.g., Kirk Makin, “Top court puts leash on random searches by sniffer dogs”, The 
Globe and Mail (April 26, 2008), A15. 
4  The source of police duties is derived from legislation, usually the legislation governing 
the police in the particular jurisdiction, and tends to define police duties in rather broad terms: 
“preserving the peace”, “preventing crimes and other offences”, “apprehending criminals and other 
offenders” etc. See, e.g., Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, s. 42.  
5  It invariably will be, unless the officer is involved in some entirely illegitimate activity 
completely unrelated to his or her official duties. See Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force, 
[1998] O.J. No. 5274, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 116-17 (Ont. C.A.).  
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interests. If the benefits are characterized as outweighing the costs, the 
action is said to be “justifiable” and a new police power is born.
6
 
Ever since the Supreme Court of Canada first used the ancillary 
powers doctrine to fashion a new police power in Dedman,
7
 criticism of 
the doctrine has been unrelenting. Originally, it came in the form of a 
scathing dissent by Dickson C.J.C. He categorically rejected that R. v. 
Waterfield,
8
 the English decision that the majority fastened upon as 
supplying the authority for an ancillary powers doctrine, authorized 
courts to create new police powers. Chief Justice Dickson expressed 
serious reservations regarding this move, which he saw as “nothing short 
of a fiat for illegality on the part of the police whenever the benefit of 
police action appeared to outweigh the infringement of an individual‟s 
rights”.
9
 For him, it was “the function of the legislature, not the courts, to 
authorize ... police action that would otherwise be unlawful as a violation 
of rights traditionally protected at common law”.
10
 
While members of the judiciary voiced initial criticism regarding the 
use of the ancillary powers doctrine to create new police powers, over 
the last 25 years skepticism has come almost exclusively from 
commentators.
11
 In the interim, the Supreme Court has uncritically 
                                                                                                             
6  See R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Dedman”]. See also R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Mann”].  
7  Dedman, id., was the first case in which the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the 
doctrine as a bases for creating new police powers. In that case, it was a power to briefly detain 
motorists at sobriety check-stops.  
8  [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (Ct. Crim. App.) [hereinafter “Waterfield”].  
9  Dedman, supra, note 6, at 15 (quoting Reference re Judicature Act (Alberta), s. 27(1), 
[1984] S.C.J. No. 64, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697, at 718-19 (S.C.C.), Dickson J., dissenting) [hereinafter 
“Wiretap Reference”].  
10  Id. 
11  See generally Howard Chisvin, “R. v. Dedman: Annotation” (1985) 34 M.V.R. 165; Glen 
Luther, “Police Power and The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Creation or Control” (1986) 51 
Sask. L. Rev. 117; R.J. Delisle, “Judicial Creation of Police Powers” (1993) 20 C.R. (4th) 29; 
Heather Pringle, “The Smoke and Mirrors of Godoy: Creating Common Law Authority While 
Making Feeney Disappear” (1999) 21 C.R. (5th) 227; Don Stuart, “Time to Recodify Criminal Law 
and Rise Above Law and Order Expediency: Lessons from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution” 
(2000) 28 Man. L.J. 89; Aman S. Patel, “Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and 
Growing Judicial Deference to Police Judgment” (2000) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198; Steve Coughlan, 
“Search Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed with Caution or Full Stop?” (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 49; 
Lesley A. MCoy, “Liberty‟s Last Stand? Tracing the Limits of Investigative Detention” (2002) 46 
Crim. L.Q. 319; Peter Sankoff, “Articulable Cause Based Searches Incident to Detention — This 
Cooke May Spoil the Broth” (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 41; James Stribopoulos, “A Failed Experiment? 
Investigative Detention: Ten Years Later” (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 335 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, A 
„Failed Experiment?‟”]; Lesley A. McCoy, “Some Answers from the Supreme Court on 
Investigative Detention … and Some More Questions” (2004) 49 Crim. L.Q. 268 [hereinafter 
“McCoy, „Some Answers … More Questions‟”]; Tim Quigley, “Mann, It‟s a Disappointing 
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accepted use of the ancillary powers doctrine as bases for recognizing a 
host of entirely unprecedented police powers. For example:  
 a power to briefly detain motorists at sobriety checkstops;12  
 a power to enter premises in response to disconnected 911 calls;13  
 a power to briefly detain individuals who are reasonably suspected of 
involvement in recently committed or unfolding criminal activity, 
and to conduct protective weapons searches of such individuals 
where an officer has well-founded safety concerns;
14
 
 a power to ask drivers questions about alcohol consumption and 
request their participation in sobriety tests without first complying 
with s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
15
 and 
 a power to conduct criminal investigative roadblock stops where 
such a stop is tailored to the information possessed by police, the 
seriousness of the offence being investigated, and the temporal and 
geographic connection between the situation being investigated and 
the timing and location of the roadblock.
16
  
Kang-Brown and M. (A.) represent a continuation of this judicial 
law-making trend. As explained in Part II, below, these judgments 
effectively recognize that when reasonable grounds exist to suspect an 
individual is carrying narcotics, the police have the common law 
authority to use a drug detecting dog to sniff the individual suspect, as 
                                                                                                             
Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. 
Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 93; Patrick Healy, “Investigative Detention in Canada” [2005] 
Crim. L.R. 98 [hereinafter “Healy”]; Joseph R. Marin, “R. v. Mann: Further Down the Slippery 
Slope” (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 1123 [hereinafter “Marin, „Further Down the Slippery Slope‟”]; 
James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter” 
(2005) 31 Queen‟s L.J. 1 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, „In Search of Dialogue‟”]; Christina Skibinsky, 
“Regulating Mann in Canada” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 197; James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of 
Judicially Created Police Powers: Investigative Detention after Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299 
[hereinafter “Stribopoulos, „Limits‟”]; Steve Coughlan, “Common Law Police Powers and the Rule 
of Law” (2007) 47 C.R. (6th) 266; Don Stuart, “The Unfortunate Dilution of Section 8 Protection: 
Some Teeth Remain” (1999) 25 Queen‟s L.J. 65; Don Stuart “Godoy: The Supreme Reverts to the 
Ancillary Powers Doctrine to Fill a Gap in Police Power” (1999) 21 C.R. (5th) 225. However, in 
fairness, Don Stuart seems to have changed his mind recently about the ancillary powers doctrine. 
See Don Stuart, “Charter Standards for Investigative Powers: Have the Courts Got the Balance 
Right?” in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty-
Five Years Later (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) 4.  
12  Dedman, supra, note 6.  
13  R. v. Godoy, [1999] S.C.J. No. 85, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 [hereinafter “Godoy”]. 
14  Mann, supra, note 6. 
15  R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Orbanski & Elias”]. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
16  R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clayton”]. 
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well as his or her belongings, in order to confirm or refute that suspicion. 
Although these judgments are noteworthy for what they say about police 
use of drug-sniffing dogs, they are far more significant for what they say 
about the ancillary powers doctrine.  
In Kang-Brown and M. (A.), for the first time since Dickson C.J.C.‟s 
dissent in Dedman, disagreement has broken out between the Supreme 
Court judges regarding the propriety of the Court using the ancillary 
powers doctrine to create new police powers.
17
 This disagreement 
strongly suggests that the fate of this doctrine as a future source of police 
powers may suddenly be in doubt.  
This short paper will critically evaluate the Court‟s judgments in 
Kang-Brown and M. (A.). Part I will explain the Court‟s conclusion that 
the use of drug-sniffing dogs involves an intrusion upon reasonable 
privacy expectations, so as to engage the protections found in section 8 
of the Charter. What section 8 demands before such searches will be 
considered “reasonable” is explored in Part III. Finally, Part IV will 
address the unexpected disagreement that has emerged between the 
judges on the use of the ancillary powers doctrine to create new police 
powers. This will include a critical evaluation of both sides in this 
emerging, and long overdue, judicial debate.  
II. DOGS “SEARCH” WHEN THEY SNIFF FOR NARCOTICS 
Importantly, all nine justices (essentially) agreed that when a police 
dog trained to sniff out narcotics focuses its olfactory powers on an 
individual‟s knapsack or luggage, the target‟s reasonable privacy 
expectations are encroached upon. In other words, this constitutes a 
“search” for section 8 Charter purposes, a conclusion that triggers the 
“reasonableness” requirements of the guarantee. 
This conclusion may seem obvious to many. After all, if the dog isn‟t 
“searching” when it is “sniffing” at someone‟s bag, what is the point of 
the sniff? Amazingly, however, the answer did not seem entirely clear-
cut as these two cases made their way before the Supreme Court of 
Canada. This was primarily because the United States Supreme Court 
long ago decided that dog sniffs do not constitute a “search” for Fourth 
                                                                                                             
17  To be clear, in dissent in Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 15, LeBel J. (joined by Fish J.) 
did express strong skepticism toward the use of “law-making powers by the courts”, including the 
expansion of the common law, to fill gaps in formal police powers. Id., at paras. 69-70, 80-84. But 
unlike in Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, the majority in Orbanski & Elias did not take the opportunity 
to respond directly to these concerns.  
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Amendment purposes. In United States v. Place,
18
 the U.S. Supreme 
Court came to this conclusion because, as O‟Connor J. explained for the 
majority: 
… the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a 
contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities 
something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained 
is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the 
property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience 
entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods. 
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no 
other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in 
which the information is obtained and in the content of the information 
revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular 
course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here — 
exposure of respondent‟s luggage, which was located in a public place, 
to a trained canine — did not constitute a “search” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.
19 
In light of this decision, there was concern that our top court might 
come to a similar conclusion. More specifically, it was feared that the 
Court might draw too ready a parallel between the odour of drugs 
emanating from luggage and waste heat emanating from a home.
20
 In R. 
v. Tessling,
21
 the Supreme Court of Canada held that police use of the 
FLIR (Forward Looking Infra-Red device), a heat detecting device used 
to spot unusual amounts of heat escaping from a home, a tell-tale sign of 
marijuana grow lamps, did not constitute a “search” for section 8 
purposes. In Tessling, the Court characterized the information gleaned 
from the FLIR as “meaningless” because poor insulation, a pottery kiln, 
a hot bath or a sauna could also have caused the unusually hot heat 
signature.
22
 Thankfully, in Kang-Brown and M. (A.) the Court recognized 
                                                                                                             
18  462 U.S. 696 (1983) [hereinafter “Place”]. 
19  Id., at 707.  
20  See, e.g., Don Stuart, “R. v. M. (A.): Annotation” (2006) 37 C.R. (6th) 372 and the cases 
he cites applying R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Tessling”] in this way.  
21  Id.  
22  Although such information, in the abstract, may seem unimportant and inconsequential, 
in Tessling, id., when combined with a confidential informant‟s tip, it proved sufficient for the 
issuance of a search warrant: hardly “meaningless”, to be sure. See Steve Coughlan & Marc S. 
Gorbet, “Nothing Plus Nothing Equals … Something? A Proposal for FLIR Warrants on Reasonable 
Suspicion” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 239. 
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a significant difference between the use of the FLIR and the use of drug 
detecting dogs. 
A properly trained dog is capable of telling its handler something 
extraordinarily meaningful, that a narcotic is being secreted. The 
Supreme Court of Canada refused to follow the lead of its American 
counterpart, remembering its earlier precedents, which make clear that 
the unlawful nature of the targeted conduct does not vitiate an 
individual‟s reasonable privacy expectations.
23
 To hold otherwise, Binnie 
J. recognized, writing on behalf of a majority of the justices in Kang-
Brown on this point, would mean that all Canadians, innocent or guilty, 
would henceforth be subject to having their persons and effects sniffed at 
by police drug detecting dogs, at the whim of law enforcement, 
whenever they happened to move through public spaces. This possibility, 




Although Binnie J.‟s concerns about the impact of allowing police to 
use drug-sniffing dogs at their sole discretion may seem alarmist to 
some, the experience in the United States in the aftermath of Place 
suggests otherwise. There, the holding that the Fourth Amendment is not 
engaged has meant that drug-sniffing dogs have become a routine part of 
American life, with dogs sniffing at individuals and their belongings 
when they happen to be in transit, either by plane, bus, train or car. 
Beyond travellers, schools and their students are also regularly targeted 
for visits by police officers and their drug-sniffing dogs. Absent any 
constitutional constraints, the only real limits on the use of such dogs are 
police ingenuity and resources.
25
 Remembering that experience, the 
Supreme Court of Canada was undoubtedly right to conclude that our 
Constitution should demand more. 
III. “REASONABLENESS” AND DRUG-SNIFFING DOG SEARCHES 
Consensus among the justices broke down, however, when it came to 
passing on what section 8 of the Charter demands for such searches to be 
                                                                                                             
23  See, e.g., R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Wong”]. 
24  Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 71. 
25  See, e.g., Hope Walker Hall, “Sniffing Out the Fourth Amendment: United States v. 
Place — Dog Sniff — Ten Years Later” (1994) 46 Me. L. Rev. 151, at 171-84, who details the 
steady expansion of Place to a variety of different contexts. For a review and critique of the United 
States Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence on the use of drug-sniffing dogs, see Ken Lammers, “Canine 
Sniffs: The Search That Isn‟t” (2003) 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 845. 
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considered “reasonable”. R. v. Collins
26
 long ago established that to be 
“reasonable” a search or seizure must satisfy three preconditions: (1) it 
must be authorized by law; (2) the law itself must be reasonable; and (3) 
it must be carried out in a reasonable manner.
27
 Disagreement among the 
nine justices regarding the first and second preconditions is what led to 
four separate sets of reasons in Kang-Brown and M. (A.). 
We will return to their disagreement regarding Collins‟ first requirement 
in Part IV, as that discussion involves the ancillary power doctrine and 
supplies our main focus. For now, a few words about the controversy 
surrounding the second requirement, that the law authorizing the search 
be reasonable. With respect to that precondition the judges were sharply 
divided on the evidentiary threshold required to justify the use of drug-
sniffing dogs. 
Four justices (McLachlin C.J.C. and Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein 
JJ.) were of the view that reasonable suspicion that a person is carrying 
narcotics is what section 8 demands before a drug-sniffing dog can be 
used by police. This bloc emphasized that relative to other kinds of 
searches, a dog sniff is comparatively less intrusive and, therefore, 
should be permitted on a less exacting standard than that normally 
required by section 8, i.e., reasonable and probable grounds.
28
 
In contrast, four of the other justices (LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron 
JJ.) concluded that the more exacting reasonable and probable grounds 
standard is indeed what section 8 requires, refusing to countenance a 
lessening of the standard in this context. For this bloc, even though 
physically less intrusive, the information gleaned through the use of drug 
sniffing dogs is just as private and worthy of protection as it would be if 
the police instead reached inside an individual‟s pockets or looked inside 
an individual‟s bag to probe for evidence. 
The tie-breaker on this important issue was Bastarache J. He went 
much further than Binnie J. was prepared to go, agreeing that reasonable 
suspicion is indeed the appropriate standard, but expressing the view that 
                                                                                                             
26  [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Collins”].  
27  Id., at 278. See also R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No.1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at 23 (S.C.C.).  
28  In both judgments, Binnie J., effectively writing for the majority on the applicable 
constitutional standard, emphasized that the dogs were used for “routine crime investigation” and 
that the cases did not involve “explosives, guns or other public safety concerns”. See Kang-Brown, 
supra, note 1, at para. 18, per Binnie J., and M. (A.), supra, note 2, at para. 3, per Binnie J. In 
M. (A.), he goes on to suggest that where a potential threat to public safety is the motivation, “even if 
speculative”, “the legal balance would have come down on the side of the use of sniffer dogs to get 
to the bottom of a possible threat”: id., at para. 37, strongly suggesting that sniffer dogs trained to 
detect guns and explosives could be used to counter threats to public safety without the need for 
particularized suspicion.  
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it need not be individualized to justify the use of such dogs. Rather, a 
generalized suspicion, for example, that drugs are routinely being 
trafficked through a particular location (like a bus depot or an airport), 
would be enough to justify the use of drug-detecting dogs to sniff at 
travellers and their belongings.  
The effect of Bastarache J.‟s vote is that reasonable suspicion emerges 
as the controlling constitutional standard in this context. And, given that 
four of the justices insisted that it be of a particularized nature, the clear 
implication would seem to be that before police can use such dogs to 
sniff at an individual or his or her belongings, section 8 of the Charter 
requires that they possess reasonable grounds to suspect that the person 
is carrying narcotics on his or her person or inside his or her belongings. 
The emergence of reasonable suspicion as the controlling constitutional 
standard for the use of drug-sniffing dogs for criminal investigative 
purposes seems like a sensible compromise. Had the Court held that 
“reasonable and probable grounds to believe” was the applicable 
standard, which was the position of the minority, the use of such dogs 
would have been rendered practically unimportant. If the police possess 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe an individual is carrying a 
controlled substance they are legally entitled to arrest that person.
29
 Once 
an individual is lawfully arrested the police are then entitled to search his 
or her person, belongings and surroundings.
30
 In fact, such a search may 
even precede the arrest, provided that the requisite grounds are in place 
at the time of the search.
31
 Consequently, there would be no practical 
need for police to resort to drug-sniffing dogs if reasonable and probable 
grounds had emerged as the controlling constitutional standard. 
Practicalities aside, the reasonable suspicion standard also makes 
good sense in this context as a matter of constitutional principle. Hunter 
v. Southam Inc.
32
 made clear that reasonableness is a context-specific 
determination.
33
 This left an opening for requiring less onerous safeguards 
                                                                                                             
29  See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 495(1)(a). On the reasonable and probable 
grounds standard, as it applies to arrest, see R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 
(S.C.C.).  
30  See generally R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.). 
31  See R. v. Debot, [1986] O.J. No. 994, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207, at 223-25 (Ont. C.A.), affd 
[1989] S.C.J. No. 118, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.) but without addressing 
this discrete issue. 
32  [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Hunter v. Southam”, cited to C.C.C.]. 
33  For example, the Court noted that where “the State‟s interest is not simply law 
enforcement as, for instance, where State security is involved, or where the individual‟s interest is 
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for searches in the regulatory, administrative, customs and school 
contexts.
34
 Admittedly, where the state‟s purpose is criminal law 
enforcement, the Supreme Court has usually insisted on strict adherence 
to Hunter v. Southam‟s requirements,
35
 including the need for reasonable 
and probable grounds as a precondition for a constitutional search or 
seizure.
36
 There are, however, some sensible exceptions that have also 
been carved out in the criminal investigative realm. 
The rationale behind these exceptions has been twofold: first, the 
privacy expectation involved and, second, the intrusiveness of the search 
power being considered. In cases where privacy expectations are high 
and the search power is quite intrusive, such as where state action would 
interfere with an individual‟s bodily integrity, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that even greater protections than those demanded by Hunter v. 
Southam are required.
37
 In contrast, where privacy expectations are 
diminished and the search power is not very intrusive, the Supreme Court 




                                                                                                             
not simply his expectation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threatens his bodily integrity, 
the relevant standard might well be a different one”, id., at 114-15. 
34  With respect to border searches, see R. v. Simmons, [1988] S.C.J. No. 86, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 
495 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Simmons”]; R. v. Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Monney, [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Monney”, cited to C.C.C.]. With respect to administrative searches, see Comité 
paritaire de l’industrie de la chemise v. Potash, [1994] S.C.J. No. 7, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406 (S.C.C.); 
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada, [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.). With respect to school 
searches, see R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.).  
35  For example, the Court has specifically cautioned “that departures from the Hunter v. 
Southam standards that will be considered reasonable will be exceedingly rare”. See Simmons, 
id., at 319. 
36  Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 32, at 112-15. The other requirements are a warrant, 
where it is feasible to obtain one (id., at 109-10) and the need for someone capable of acting 
judicially (i.e., a judge or justice of the peace) to pass on the adequacy of the grounds for the 
issuance of the warrant (id., at 112-15).  
37  See R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244 (S.C.C.) 
(“when the search and seizure relates to the integrity of the body rather than the home, for example, 
the standard is even higher than usual”, at 262 C.C.C.). See also Monney, supra, note 34, at 151-52; 
R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at 342 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 88 (S.C.C.). 
38  See, e.g., R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 
229 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wise”] (after noting that the privacy expectation in one‟s vehicle is 
“markedly diminished” relative to one‟s home or office, the Court indicated that given that an 
electronic tracking device only reveals a vehicle‟s location, it is “a less intrusive means of 
surveillance than electronic audio or video surveillance. Accordingly, a lower standard such as a 
„solid ground‟ for suspicion would be a basis for obtaining an authorization from an independent 
authority, such as a justice of the peace, to install a device and monitor the movements of a 
vehicle”). Arguably, the pat-down protective search power recognized in Mann, supra, note 6, also 
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Although a dog sniff is self-evidently a “search”, relative to other 
searches it is arguably at the more benign end on the spectrum of 
intrusiveness.
39
 To be effective it requires little more than the target 
briefly holding still as the dog passes by in close enough proximity to 
sniff at the person and his or her belongings. Unlike most other searches, 
there is no need for law enforcement officials to physically handle either 
the individual or his or her personal items. In short, the majority‟s 
conclusion that “reasonable suspicion” strikes the right constitutional 
balance between state and individual interests in this context seems 
conceptually sound.  
A closer reading of LeBel J.‟s judgment in Kang-Brown suggests 
that the minority might have been inclined to agree, had the deviation 
from Hunter v. Southam standards come from Parliament rather than 
from the majority‟s judgment. Justice LeBel explains this subtle but 
important distinction:  
A statutory provision on the appropriate use of sniffer dogs in law 
enforcement on grounds that fall short of the standard established in 
Hunter v. Southam might require justification under s. 1, but state 
action would not be foreclosed so long as the standard for justification 
was met under the relevant constitutional test. A requirement that 
Parliament act first would put the courts in a better position to address 
the competing interests at play and would ensure that the justification 
process meets constitutional standards. The extension of common law 
police powers as proposed in this case would shortcut the justification 
process and leave the Court to frame the common law rule itself 
without the full benefit of the dialogue and discussion that would have 
taken place had Parliament acted and been required to justify its 
action.
40 
In other words, deviations from Hunter v. Southam‟s basic constitutional 
requirements are something that should be left for Parliament, with the 
                                                                                                             
falls into this category. That power would seem to be contingent on the detaining officer having 
reasonable grounds to suspect that the individual detained may be carrying a weapon, an 
understandable deviation from the “reasonable and probable grounds” standard, in light of the less 
intrusive nature of the search (a pat-down, with no probing into pockets or under clothing) and the 
important and limited interest being served (police safety rather than evidence acquisition). See 
Mann, id., 14 at paras. 36-45. Unfortunately, the Court‟s choice of language in Mann in articulating 
the relevant standard is itself confusing. See Stribopoulos, “Limits”, supra, note 11, at 310-11. 
39  Of course assuming that the dog is well behaved. Obviously if police use an ill-tempered 
dog different considerations arise; for example, concerns about the reasonableness of the manner in 
which the search is carried out, under the third prong of Collins, may arise. See supra, notes 26-27 
and accompanying text.  
40  Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 14.  
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Court‟s role limited to whether in a particular situation a legislated 
exception can be reasonably justified under section 1 of the Charter. This 
leads directly to a much larger controversy regarding the role of the 
Supreme Court of Canada under the Charter on questions pertaining to 
the source and scope of police powers.  
IV. THE LARGER IMPLICATIONS: THE FATE OF  
JUDICIALLY CREATED POLICE POWERS 
No statute authorizes the use of drug-sniffing dogs by police. As a 
result, legal authority for their use, if it exists, must be derived from the 
common law. If one were to examine the “common law” as it has been 
historically understood in England and throughout the Commonwealth, 
i.e., the written reasons of judges from previously decided cases, one will 
find no mention of drug-sniffing dogs. I do not mean to suggest by this 
that the common law is somehow static. To the contrary, the great genius 
of the common law system is indeed its organic nature; specifically, the 
ability of judges to apply established tools of legal reasoning to 




Historically, when it came to government interfering with individual 
liberties, our courts were very reluctant to use their law-making authority 
to expand state powers. In fact, in this context, the common law courts 
traditionally showed much restraint. That restraint eventually became the 
bedrock of English constitutional law, taking the “principle of legality” 
as its label. Applying that principle, common law courts have long 
insisted that any interference with individual liberty or property rights be 
premised on clear legal authority. Absent such authority, the common 
law erred on the side of individual freedom.
42
 It is in this sense that the 
                                                                                                             
41  See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), who explains the common law ideal of “doctrinal stability”, which 
finds expression in the concept of stare decisis. According to Eisenberg, “the courts must establish 
and apply rules that are supported by the general standards of society or the special standards of the 
legal system, and must adopt a process of reasoning that is replicable by the profession.” Id., at 47. 
Eisenberg goes on to provide a very useful taxonomy of the various modes of common law legal 
reasoning, which include: (1) Reasoning from Precedent; (2) Reasoning from Principle; (3) 
Reasoning by Analogy; (4) Reasoning from Doctrines Established in the Professional Literature; (5) 
Reasoning from Hypotheticals. Id., at 50-103. 
42  For a detailed discussion of the principle of legality, including its origins and its 
recognition in Canadian law, see Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 11, at 6-13. 
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In the search and seizure context the principle of legality has a very 
long lineage. It can be traced all the way back to Entick v. Carrington,
44
 
one of England‟s earliest and most celebrated search cases. In that 
judgment the court refused a government request that it recognize, for the 
first time, an entirely unprecedented power on the part of the Secretary of 
State for the Northern Department to issue search warrants. In rejecting 
that request, Lord Chief Justice Camden remarked: 
What would the parliament say, if the judges should take upon 
themselves to mould an unlawful power into a convenient authority, by 
new restrictions? That would be, not judgment, but legislation.
45 
This same approach carried forward to Canada. In the early years of 
the Charter there was only one anomalous exception: Dedman.
46
 In that 
case a slim (five-judge) majority of the Supreme Court seized on what 
was, up until that time, a relatively obscure decision of the English Court 
of Criminal Appeals in Waterfield,
47
 which had set down a two-part test 
for assessing whether a police officer was acting in “execution of his 
duty”.
48
 (This was an element of the offence charged in that case.) In 
Dedman, however, the majority fastened on this test, and the cost-benefit 
analysis that it endorsed, transforming it into a basis for recognizing 
entirely new police powers. The power ultimately recognized in Dedman 
was the authority of police to conduct sobriety check-stops. As noted 
above, Dickson J. wrote a scathing dissent, strikingly reminiscent of 
Camden J.‟s opinion in Entick v. Carrington, in which he admonished 
                                                                                                             
43  Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 12, LeBel J. concurring. 
44  (1765), Howell‟s State Trials 1030.  
45  Id., at 1068.  
46  Dedman, supra, note 6. 
47  Waterfield, supra, note 8. 
48  The relevant passage from Waterfield, id., provides, at 661: 
In most cases it is probably more convenient to consider what the police constable was 
actually doing and in particular whether such conduct was prima facie an unlawful 
interference with a person‟s liberty or property. If so, it is then relevant to consider 
whether (a) such conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by statute or 
recognised at common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general scope 
of such a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of police powers associated with the duty. 
Thus, while it is no doubt right to say in general terms that police constables have a duty 
to prevent crime and a duty, when crime is committed, to bring the offender to justice, it 
is also clear from the decided cases that when the execution of these general duties 
involves interference with the person or property of a private person, the powers of 
constables are not unlimited.  
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the majority for taking on a law-making role that more appropriately 
belonged to Parliament. 
For a while, at least, the law-making authority that Dedman 
recognized seemed to lie dormant. In the interim, the Supreme Court of 
Canada repeatedly refused to recognize new police powers in response to 
Charter challenges under section 8, thereby engaging Parliament in a 
form of dialogue that led to the creation of a number of much needed 
legislated search powers.
49
 During this period, the Supreme Court sent 
strong signals that it would not again use the ancillary powers doctrine to 
create new police powers. As La Forest J. explained, on behalf of the 
majority in Wong: 
The common law powers of search were extremely narrow, and the 
courts have left it to Parliament to extend them where need be … it 
does not sit well for the courts, as the protectors of our fundamental 
rights, to widen the possibility of encroachments on these personal 
liberties. It falls to Parliament to make incursions on fundamental rights 
if it is of the view that they are needed for the protection of the public 
in a properly balanced system of criminal justice.
50 
This is how things remained throughout most of the 1990s under the 
Lamer Court, with only one isolated exception.
51
  
The turning point seemed to come in Mann,
52
 when the Supreme 
Court used the ancillary powers doctrine to recognize a police power to 
briefly detain an individual if a police officer has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the individual is involved in recently committed or unfolding 
criminal activity. That power was combined with a limited protective 
pat-down search power, available where police have objectively based 
grounds to be concerned for their safety. Rather ironic was the Supreme 
Court‟s failure to acknowledge the extensive body of case law, cases that 
predated lower court developments that applied the Waterfield test to 
recognize an investigative detention power, which had clearly and 
consistently held that at common law there is no power to detain for 
investigative purposes short of actual arrest.
53
  
                                                                                                             
49  I have elsewhere chronicled all this in far greater detail: see Stribopoulos, “In Search of 
Dialogue”, supra, note 11.  
50  Supra, note 23, at 56. 
51  See Godoy, supra, note 13, applying the Waterfield test to recognize a police power to 
enter private premises to investigate disconnected 911 calls. 
52  Mann, supra, note 6. 
53  See R. v. Hicks, [1988] O.J. No. 957, 42 C.C.C. (3d) 394, at 400 (Ont. C.A.), affd on 
other grounds, [1988] S.C.J. No. 7, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.); R. v. Moran, [1987] O.J. No. 794, 
36 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at 258 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 213 (S.C.C.); 
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With few exceptions, Mann has been widely criticized by 
commentators (myself included).
54
 The chief complaint regarding the 
decision is that it tends to raise more questions than it answers, and in the 
process creates much confusion and thereby increases the chances of 
unjustified and abusive police stops.
55
 In this sense, it provides a 
textbook example of the problems inherent when the courts exceed their 
institutional capacities and begin creating entirely new and unprecedented 
police powers, taking on an almost legislative rather than judicial role.
56
 
Nevertheless, given the complexity of the issues raised by Mann, the 
case seemed to signal that any reluctance the Supreme Court had 
periodically expressed about creating new police powers had fallen by 
the wayside. Since Mann was decided, the Supreme Court has used the 
ancillary powers doctrine to recognize some rather significant and 
entirely unprecedented police powers.
57
  
And then came the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Kang-Brown and 
M. (A.). Suddenly, for the first time since Dedman, a debate broke out 
among the justices regarding the legitimacy and efficacy of using the 
ancillary powers doctrine to create new police powers. 
In a concurring judgment in Kang-Brown, LeBel J. (joined by Fish, 
Abella and Charron JJ.) refused to use the ancillary powers doctrine to 
recognize a “common law” power on the part of police to use drug-
sniffing dogs. In a judgment strongly reminiscent of the Supreme Court‟s 
pronouncements in the 1980s and early 1990s, this group rejected the 
idea that it was the Court‟s role to fill the gaps in formal police powers. 
Justice LeBel wrote:  
                                                                                                             
R. v. Esposito, [1985] O.J. No. 1002, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88, at 94 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused, 
[1986] S.C.C.A. No. 63, [1986] 1 S.C.R. viii (S.C.C.); R. v. Dedman, [1981] O.J. No. 2993, 59 
C.C.C. (2d) 97, at 108-109 (Ont. C.A.), affd on other grounds [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
2 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cluett, [1982] N.S.J. No. 542, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 333, at 347-48 (N.S.C.A.), revd on 
other grounds [1985] S.C.J. No. 54, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 318 (S.C.C.); R. v. Guthrie, [1982] A.J. No. 29, 
69 C.C.C. (2d) 216, at 218-19 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Moore, [1978] S.C.J. No. 82, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 195, 
43 C.C.C. (2d) 83, at 89-90 (S.C.C.); Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 2 Q.B. 414, at 419 (C.A.); Kenlin v. 
Gardner, [1967] 2 Q.B. 510 (C.A.); Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamilton, [1958] O.J. No. 105, 118 
C.C.C. 24, at 26-27 (Ont. C.A.). 
54  See supra, note 11. 
55  See for example McCoy, “Some Answers … More Questions”, supra, note 11; Marin, 
“Further Down the Slippery Slope”, supra, note 11; Stribopoulos, “Limits”, supra, note 11. 
56  See generally Stribopoulos, id.  
57  See supra, notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text. Although LeBel and Fish JJ. had 
expressed strong skepticism about this sort of ad hoc law-making in their dissenting judgment in 
Orbanski & Elias, supra, note 15, their vote in favour of recognizing a police power at “common 
law” to conduct roadblocks for criminal investigative purposes in Clayton, supra, note 16, seemed to 
signal a possible change of heart. 
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The common law has long been viewed as a law of liberty. Should we 
move away from that tradition, which is still part of the ethos of our 
legal system and of our democracy? This case is about the freedom of 
individuals and the proper function of the courts as guardians of the 
Constitution. I doubt that it should lead us to depart from the common 
law tradition of freedom by changing the common law itself to restrict 
the freedoms protected by the Constitution under s. 8 of the Charter.
58 
More practically, LeBel J. explained this reluctance by noting: “the 
courts are ill-equipped to develop an adequate legal framework for the 
use of police dogs”. 
59
  
It is difficult to quarrel with these observations about the historic 
importance of the common law in protecting liberty and the need for 
courts to act with restraint before recognizing new police powers, 
especially where those powers would have complex and far-reaching 
consequences. 
The only troubling aspect of LeBel J.‟s analysis is his failure to 
convincingly explain why it was appropriate in Mann and Clayton to use 
the ancillary powers doctrine in this way, whereas it was inappropriate to 
do so in these cases. The complexity of the various issues raised by 
investigative detention power (for example, the use of force to effect 
such detentions, the temporal and geographic limits on them, the 
difficulty in reconciling this power with the right to counsel on detention 
found in section 10(b) of the Charter, and what, if any, corresponding 
obligations the power might impose on those detained, etc.
60
) suggests 
that, if anything, the dog-sniff power is better suited for recognition 
under the ancillary powers doctrine than were investigative detentions. 
In his concurring reasons in Kang-Brown, Binnie J. (joined by 
McLachlin C.J.C.) took exception to this sudden trepidation on the part 
of LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charon JJ. For Binnie J., the use of the 
ancillary powers doctrine to create new police powers is part of a long 
tradition of “incremental” expansion of the common law. That doctrine 
simply provides courts with a methodology, like many judge-created 
methodologies used by common law courts over time, to develop the law 
in a particular area.
61
 
With respect, the difficulty with this view is that it largely ignores 
the fact that there is nothing at all “incremental” about how new police 
                                                                                                             
58  Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 12. 
59  Id., at para. 15.  
60  See generally Stribopoulos, “Limits”, supra, note 11.  
61  Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at paras. 50-51. 
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powers are created under the cost-benefit analysis supplied by the 
ancillary powers doctrine. The truth is, our courts have used the doctrine 
to create police powers out of whole cloth. These new powers have no 
linkage to earlier judgments, and sometimes serve to implicitly overrule 
cases that pronounced on the absence of any such power (i.e., 
investigative detention providing the best example). This reality seems to 
contradict Binnie J.‟s rather charitable characterization of the ancillary 
powers doctrine. 
In addition, Binnie J.‟s defence of the ancillary powers doctrine in 
Kang-Brown runs up against his rather frank acknowledgment in 
Clayton, where he agrees “with the critics that Waterfield is an odd 
godfather for common law police powers”.
62
  
That said, Binnie J. does seem to have the better argument at points. 
In his reasons in Kang-Brown he rightly complains that the approach 
advocated by LeBel J. would breed even greater uncertainty. Litigants 
would have no way of knowing what approach the Court might be 
inclined to employ in a given case, one in which it is receptive to 
creating new police powers under the Waterfield test or one in which it 
insists on deferring such law-making responsibilities to Parliament.
63
  
For Binnie J. the question was settled long ago. The only way 
forward, he insists, is for the courts to “proceed incrementally with the 
Waterfield/Dedman analysis of common law police powers rather than 




One is left to wonder, however, whether “crossing the Rubicon” is 
ever an appropriate analogy when it comes to judicial decision-making. 
For example, would it have answered the claim made in Brown v. Board 
of Education
65
 that the United States Supreme Court had already crossed 
the Rubicon when it decided in Plessy v. Ferguson
66
 that “separate but 
equal” was consistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment? 
Or, looking for a more contemporary and Canadian example, how 
sound a response would it have been for the Supreme Court of Canada in 
R. v. Henry
67
 to refuse to reconsider its earlier judgments because it had 
                                                                                                             
62  Clayton, supra, note 16, at para. 75. 
63  Kang-Brown, supra, note 1, at para. 22. 
64  Id., at para. 51. 
65  347 U.S. 483 (1958).  
66  163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
67  [2005] S.C.J. No. 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.).  
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already crossed the Rubicon under section 13 of the Charter by 
repeatedly embracing the unworkable incrimination versus impeachment 
distinction? 
My point is, even questions that seem settled are not always so. As I 
have argued elsewhere: 
In part, the long-term viability of any common law constitutional 
system very much depends on the authority and willingness of its final 
court of appeal to revisit established doctrine when experience has 
demonstrated that one of its earlier judgments is either being 
misconstrued or was wrongly decided. This seems especially true in a 
system such as ours in Canada where the Constitution is considered to 
be a “living tree”.  
Just as important, for reasons going to its institutional integrity, the 
Court must proceed with great caution before substantially revamping 
established precedent or taking the drastic step of overruling an earlier 
judgment. If the Court appears too eager to revisit established 
principles then the authority of its judgments will be undermined and 
its institutional integrity will needlessly suffer. In other words, the 
institutional integrity of the Court would seem to depend both on its 
willingness to reconsider its past decisions when the reasons for doing 




As Justice Patrick Healy has correctly pointed out, the ancillary 
powers doctrine crept into our law like “something of a Trojan-horse for 
the expansion of police powers”.
69
 As a result, the debate that has finally 
broken out among the justices at the Supreme Court of Canada on its 
continued use and utility is most welcome and long overdue. 
In Kang-Brown, Bastarache J. clearly had no difficulty with the idea 
of the Supreme Court taking the responsibility of filling gaps in police 
powers. He was quite willing to grant the police this new power based on 
little more than generalized suspicion. With his retirement, it remains to 
be determined how his replacement, Cromwell J., might feel about the 
place of the ancillary powers doctrine within our constitutional democracy. 
It is Cromwell J. who would seem to hold the decisive vote on the future 
of this controversial source of new police powers. Unfortunately, there 
                                                                                                             
68  James Stribopoulos, “Has Everything Been Decided? Certainty, the Charter, and 
Criminal Justice” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 381, at 385. 
69  Healy, supra, note 11.  
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One thing is certain, the Supreme Court of Canada will have plenty 
of opportunities in the future to decide whether this doctrine should 
continue as a part of our law or whether the cases that facilitated its 
covert entry into our legal system should be overruled. This is because, 
in the absence of a comprehensive code of criminal procedure in Canada, 
which is unlikely as long as the Supreme Court is willing to fill the gaps 
in police powers through its use of the ancillary powers doctrine, these 
sorts of cases will increasingly become a routine part of the Court‟s 
work. 
                                                                                                             
70  During his tenure on the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Cromwell J. was never involved 
in a case in which the ancillary powers doctrine was at issue.  
